Regionally, there is a dearth of officially published data on inequality. Most countries do not collect or publish information on income and wealth distribution, discrimination or the redistributive impacts of public policies. Available data on many SDG indicators omit critical information for understanding inequality, including data on income and wealth distribution by sex, age, disability status, national origin, ethnicity, employment, geographical location and other relevant factors. This lack of data reflects insufficient policy attention to inequality and poses a significant obstacle to understanding the evolution of cross-cutting inequalities within the region.
What is without doubt is that economic growth has not been sufficiently inclusive or created the quality work opportunities needed to sustainably reduce poverty as aggregate growth rates did not transmit to households. Simultaneously, redistributive policies remain weak. Tax systems in the region are largely regressive, and social expenditures are both relatively low and relatively inefficient (see chapter on SDG 1). Long-running conflicts have also a detrimental impact on reducing wealth inequalities within and between countries in the region.
Social inequalities emerging from discriminatory laws, norms and practices, relatively weak rule of law and limited civic space to advocate for social justice also contribute to inequalities of opportunity that leave millions of people behind. Reducing inequality will require Arab countries to reassert the role of the State as the guarantor of economic and social rights through policies to promote pro-poor growth and decent job generation, effectively tax and redistribute wealth, and protect the rights of all people.
Constitutions across the region include guarantees of
equal rights and protection against discrimination based on
several characteristics. Many Arab countries have signed
international conventions to uphold the rights of vulnerable
populations.
Although constitutional provisions vary in
scope, the following characteristics are most frequently
offered specific protections:
Gender (16 constitutions) Race (16 constitutions) Religion (16 constitutions) Disability status (6 constitutions) Political belief (6 constitutions)
Tax rates are generally low across the region. At an
estimated 8 per cent of GDP, the region’s tax-to-GDP ratio is
considerably below the median rates for middle- and high-income
countries globally, which were 18 and 25 per cent,
respectively, in 2019. Tax-to-GDP rates in the Arab countries
that year stood at:
1.5 per cent in conflict-affected countries.
4 per cent in the Gulf Cooperation Council countries. 7 per cent in the least developed countries. 19 per cent in middle-income countries.9
Tax systems in the region generally do not have a
large redistributive impact.
Countries heavily rely on
indirect taxes, with personal income taxes contributing
a relatively small share of total tax revenue. Value-added
taxes and levies on natural resource exploitation generally
contribute most government finances. While this is
particularly true in the Gulf Cooperation Council countries,
which impose few direct taxes, income and corporate
taxes also make up a relatively small share of total tax
income in middle-income countries, typically not exceeding
20 per cent, and even less in the least developed countries.
Although most middle-income and least developed
countries have personal income taxes in place, valueadded
taxes typically constitute the largest source of tax
revenue. In Jordan, they account for nearly 70 per cent
of total tax revenues.10 The Gulf Cooperation Council
countries have recently introduced value-added taxes, but
have few forms of direct taxation on income.
Social expenditures are low in the region compared
to global averages and underutilized as a tool to combat
inequality.
Despite comparable levels of total government
spending, the region channels only 8.3 per cent of GDP
to health, education and social protection, compared to a
global average of 19.8 per cent. Meanwhile, Arab countries
spend considerably more than the global average on
consumption subsidies and military and police forces.13 This
imbalance means that public expenditures fall short of their
potential to empower populations and reduce inequalities of
outcome and opportunity. Instead, they reinforce the status
quo of high inequalities.
As migration flows increase across the region, there is
a growing consensus on the need to adopt frameworks to
ensure the orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration
and mobility of people.
By 2020, the region’s total migrant
and refugee population was estimated at nearly 41.4 million
people. Increasing recognition of the need for well-managed
migration policies is reflected in the wide endorsement by
Arab countries of recent global frameworks on the subject: 19 Arab countries voted in favour of the 2018
Global
Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration.
21 Arab countries voted in favour of the 2018
Global
Compact on Refugees.
Many Arab countries lack policies or legislative
frameworks mandating data disaggregation by
characteristics such as age, sex, disability, migratory
status, income or geographic area, complicating
efforts to assess the full extent of inequalities in the
region.15 Most countries do not systematically collect
or publicly report information on income and wealth
distribution, and the absence of disaggregated data on
other indicators makes it challenging to fully understand
the depth of inequalities among groups. In many cases,
data collection efforts such as household surveys are
conducted irregularly, depriving policymakers of (real-time)
data to inform evidence-based policy measures.
Consequently, it is often difficult to assess the size of
inequalities within countries and the extent to which
policies are addressing them – or not.
The GCC states have historically relied on
their substantial oil wealth to finance government
expenditures and have among the lowest tax rates and
narrowest tax bases in the world, but they have recently
introduced reforms to diversify revenue streams.
In
2021, the hydrocarbon sector represented more than 70
per cent of total government revenues in
Bahrain, Kuwait,
Oman
and Qatar; roughly 60 per cent in Saudi Arabia
and nearly 50 per cent in the United Arab Emirates.16 The
Gulf Cooperation Council countries do not impose taxes
on most personal income, nor have any implemented a
wealth tax. Outside the hydrocarbon sector, corporate
income tax generally applies only to foreign-owned
companies. In Oman and the United Arab Emirates,
corporate income tax also applies to companies owned
by nationals of Gulf Cooperation Council countries.
Bahrain does not have such a tax beyond the oil and
gas sector.17 In Qatar and Saudi Arabia, companies are
mandated to pay zakat, with the latter also extending this
obligation to individuals.18
Volatile energy prices and changing economic
structures have prompted reforms to diversify revenue
bases, largely through the introduction of consumption
taxes.
Taxes in the Gulf Cooperation Council countries
have historically been very low but collections grew
from around 2 per cent of GDP in 2017 to more than
6 per cent in 2021 following reforms.19 Value added taxes
have been the main driver of this increase following an
agreement among Gulf Cooperation Council countries,
adopted in 2016, to levy such taxes at a minimum rate
of 5 per cent. As of April 2024, Kuwait and Qatar had not
yet implemented the tax. Bahrain and Saudi Arabia had
value-added tax rates of 10 and 15 per cent, respectively.
Further, the Gulf Cooperation Council states have signed
a Common Excise Tax Agreement applicable to sales
of tobacco products, energy drinks, and carbonated and
sweetened beverages, which has been implemented by all
countries except Kuwait.20 Despite boosting revenues, the
Gulf subregion remains considerably below the global high-income
country average tax-to-GDP ratio of 16.4 per cent.21
The predominance of value-added taxes in tax revenue
limits tax systems’ redistributive potential.
Most Gulf Cooperation Council countries have not
established universally applicable minimum wage rules.
The guarantee of minimum wages is often limited to
particular sectors or to nationals (as in Oman22 and
Saudi
Arabia
),23 despite expatriate workers making up more
than 75 per cent of the labour force.24 Kuwait and Qatar
are the only Gulf Cooperation Council countries with
minimum wages applicable to employees of all sectors
and nationalities. In Bahrain, regulations establish a
minimum wage only for nationals in the public sector.25 The
United Arab Emirates does not have any minimum wages,
although the labour law stipulates that salaries must cover
employees’ basic needs.26
Over the past decade, middle-income and least
developed countries have seen total revenues as a share
of GDP fall and debt levels balloon,28 severely impacting
the fiscal space available to Governments and threatening
social policy agendas. Although countries have sought to
reform their tax systems, revenues remain dominated by
regressive indirect sources of taxation.
Most countries
in this group have some form of progressive taxation in
place, with the number of personal income tax brackets
ranging from just 2 in Libya to 9 in the
Syrian Arab Republic. Rates applied to top earners range
from 13 per cent in Libya to 38 per cent in Morocco. In
recent years, many countries have adjusted tax brackets
and increased the rates applied to the highest earners,
including Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Mauritania.29 Algeria
has taken a different approach, introducing progressive
cuts to the personal income tax rate in 2022 in an effort to
preserve residents’ purchasing power amid accelerating
global inflation.30
In general, increased statutory tax rates have not led to
commensurate increases in revenue, pointing to underlying
problems with tax compliance and administration. These
challenges are common in middle-income and least
developed countries, although to differing extents.
In
some cases, measures to increase tax revenues have
been followed by a decrease in funds raised. In Egypt, for
example, corporate income tax revenue fell from 35 to
around 25 per cent of total tax revenue between 2010 and
2019, despite increases to the general corporate income tax
rate. Similarly, increased value-added tax rates in Lebanon
and Tunisia were followed by decreases of the shares of
such taxes in total revenue.32
Although most middle-income and least developed
countries in the region have established minimum wages,
their impact on inequality is often limited.
The informal sector
represents a majority of employment. In the middle-income
countries, it is common for 50 to 70 per cent of jobs to be
informal. In many least developed countries, this figure is
closer to 90 per cent.33 As such, most workers, and especially
low-wage workers, fall outside the scope of employment
regulations, severely limiting the capacity for wage policies to
reduce inequality. Such measures can be more impactful when
paired with inclusive economic growth driven by sectors
that create decent employment opportunities and incentives
for businesses and individual workers to formalize.
Like other middle-income or least developed countries in the region, Arab countries experiencing conflict or fragility34 struggle with shrinking fiscal space and rising public debt. These countries face additional challenges, however, as these issues are compounded by acute economic decline, significantly decreased capacity to mobilize domestic resources, and the effects of destruction and violence. These issues disproportionately impact poorer populations and complicate policy efforts to address inequalities.
In many countries, crises have been accompanied
by high rates of inflation and the devaluation of national currencies.
Such consequences disproportionately hit poor and middle-class households, who tend to have less diversified assets and lower savings, and spend a greater proportion of their income on necessities, making them more vulnerable to price increases.35 In Lebanon, a severe economic crisis gravely impacted multidimensional poverty rates, which grew from 42 to 82 per cent between 2019 and 2021.36 In Yemen, due to the ongoing conflict and depreciation of the rial, food now represents more than half of all expenditures for 73 per cent of households;37 19 million Yemenis require food assistance and some 2.2 million children are acutely malnourished.38 Conflict and crisis situations also deepen gender inequalities as women and girls face additional exposure to gender-based violence, higher risks of child marriage and disproportionate negative effects on their health, education and nutrition.39
Fractured political control and administrative challenges in conflict-affected countries impede revenue collection efforts and can give rise to parallel taxation structures that exacerbate inequalities. With tax collection representing only 1.5 per cent of GDP, countries experiencing conflict have by far the smallest tax intake in the region. Challenges to compliance are evident in countries in conflict and crisis situations globally; for example, despite on average having much higher statutory tax rates than non-fragile States,
these countries have significantly lower effective tax collection.40 In Yemen, tax-to-GDP ratios have fallen
by nearly 75 per cent since the outbreak of conflict as enforcement and compliance have dropped drastically. Tax compliance in the service sector has fallen below
15 per cent, and the general sales tax is now effectively imposed only on imports.41 Poor performance of direct taxation in countries experiencing conflict or fragility typically leads to more regressive tax systems, with wealthier individuals frequently having lower rates of effective taxation than the poor and middle classes.
The absence of redistribution mechanisms to ensure equitable development gains can fuel conflict. Revenue-sharing between income groups, economic classes
and geographic regions is crucial to addressing and rebalancing inequities.
While conflict increases inequality, the inverse can also be true as inequality can contribute to the outbreak of conflict. In deepening underlying tensions and amplifying group differences, inequality can undermine social cohesion and the stability of the State.46 Grievances related to intergroup and interregional inequities have been core drivers of conflict or fragility across the region.
Migration is an increasingly important policy area within the Arab region, although the nature of movements of people and policy responses varies. In aggregate, Arab countries host nearly 41.4 million international migrants and refugees, with the Gulf Cooperation Council countries standing out as a leading global destination for migrant labour from South and South-East Asia, Africa and elsewhere. Outbound migration is significant; 32.8 million migrants and refugees originated from the region in 2020. Approximately 14.5 million migrants and refugees from the region relocated to other Arab countries, representing more than one third of the region’s total migrant population. Additionally, as poor economic conditions, political instability and insecurity push people around the world to emigrate, the region’s location at the crossroads between Africa, Asia and Europe has meant that growing numbers of people traverse Arab countries en route to their destinations.
Despite the growing significance of migration, Arab countries vary in the extent to which they have adopted international legal instruments related to the issue. They have taken different approaches to extending services to migrants and refugees. Table 10.2 summarizes the adoption status of select international legal instruments related to migration in the Arab region.47
| Instrument | Adoption status |
|---|---|
| International Labour Organization (ILO) Migration for Employment Convention (1949) | Adopted by four countries (Algeria, the Comoros, Morocco and Somalia) |
| International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (1990) | Adopted by seven countries (Algeria, the Comoros, Egypt, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and the Syrian Arab Republic) |
| ILO Convention concerning Migrations in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion of Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers (1975) | Adopted by three countries (the Comoros, Mauritania and Somalia) |
| ILO Convention concerning Decent Work for Domestic Workers (2011) | Not adopted by any countries |
| ILO Private Employment Agencies Convention | Adopted by three countries (Algeria, Morocco and Somalia) |
| Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) and its 1967 Protocol | Adopted by nine countries (Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Mauritania, Morocco, Somalia, the Sudan, Tunisia and Yemen) |
| Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (2000), supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Crime | Adopted by 20 countries (Algeria, Bahrain, the Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, the State of Palestine, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia and the United Arab Emirates) |
| Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air (2000), supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Crime | Adopted by 15 countries (Algeria, Bahrain, the Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Oman, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic and Tunisia) |
| Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (1954) | Adopted by three countries (Algeria, Libya and Tunisia) |
Increasingly, Gulf Cooperation Council countries
are taking steps to improve the living conditions of migrant workers, including through legal reforms. Yet significant barriers remain to the realization of migrant rights.
Most Gulf Cooperation Council countries have launched reforms of their kafala (sponsorship) systems, which have historically tied workers’ legal residency
to their employers, who in turn may exercise extensive control over employees. Migrant workers subject to the kafala system are often required to seek their sponsor’s permission to change jobs or travel and face difficulties in quitting employment at will. Such practices deny migrant workers their rights, institutionalize power imbalances between employees and their sponsors, and enable abuse and exploitation. Reforms have curbed such controls, increased the flexibility for migrant workers to change jobs, and strengthened government oversight powers to address abuses, although such efforts are not necessarily applied to workers in all sectors.
Mashreq countries have seen their migrant and refugee populations more than double since 1990, largely as a result of protracted conflicts and forced displacement within the subregion. Several major crises have driven displacement and migration between Mashreq countries, with three quarters of their international migrants being either Palestinian or Syrian refugees.55 Notably, Jordan and Lebanon have the highest refugee populations per capita in the world.
Maghreb countries lie at the heart of migration routes connecting Africa, Europe and Western Asia. They have experienced a notable increase in irregular transit migration in recent years. The Maghreb hosts a relatively small number of migrants and refugees (3 per cent of the region’s total) but is the site of significant transit migration between sub-Saharan Africa and Europe. Given the subregion’s significant emigration trends, expatriate and diaspora governance
has received heightened attention. The Maghreb countries participate in the 5+5 Dialogue to promote cooperation with European partners on a host of issues, including migration, and have increased border control efforts in collaboration with European Union partners. The 2020 session of the dialogue resulted in an agreement on the need to better understand migration trends, facilitate mobility and regular migration, and enhance coordination to address irregular migration and exploitation of migrants.59
Several countries have recently strengthened measures to combat human trafficking and the smuggling of migrants. These include the restructuring and expansion of the anti-trafficking directorate in Iraq and the launch of anti-trafficking measures (including action plans and legislation) in the Comoros, Iraq, Mauritania and the Sudan. Refugee return is another significant policy area for countries emerging from conflict, although approaches vary significantly. For example, Somalia established an Internally Displaced Persons and Refugee-Returnee Policy in 2019 to facilitate the reintegration of such persons into mainstream life by establishing a framework for protecting their rights and providing them with assistance. Measures within the national social protection policy and land and housing policies specifically seek to address the needs of internally displaced persons and refugee-returnees. The Durable Solutions Secretariat of the Ministry of Planning support the development of policies targeting internally displaced persons, returned Somalis, and refugees and asylum seekers. In the Syrian Arab Republic, Cabinet Decision 46 (2020) requires Syrian citizens and Palestinian refugees previously resident in the country to exchange $100 to Syrian pounds at official exchange rates at the border before being allowed reentry into the territory. For Palestinians seeking to return to refugee camps, registration is limited to former residents with proof of ownership of a structurally sound house within camp boundaries.62
National actions to achieve SDG 10 can be complemented by regional cooperation to reduce inequalities. Regional actions based on solidarity and common approaches to problems requiring international coordination can help to achieve greater equality within and among countries. Examples of possible actions include:
1. ESCWA, 2022d.
2. Ibid.
3. ESCWA, 2023c.
4. ESCWA, forthcoming.
5. Ibid.
6. The term “refugee” is defined by international law as people requiring international protection and living outside their country of origin because of feared persecution, conflict, violence or other circumstances. The term “migrant” does not have an internationally accepted definition. As used here, the term refers to any person residing (permanently or temporarily) outside their country of origin, for any reason.
7. ESCWA, IOM and UNHCR, 2022.
8. See the UNHCR Refugee Data Finder, accessed on 19 January 2024.
9. ESCWA, 2022e.
10. Ibid.
11. IMF, 2022.
12. ESCWA, 2022e.
13. ESCWA, UNDP and UNICEF, 2022.
14. ESCWA, IOM and UNHCR, 2022.
15. According to national self-assessments reported in the ESCWA Arab SDG Monitor, 9 of 16 respondent countries have provisions in their national statistical law referring to data disaggregated by specific groups or characteristics such as age, sex, disability, migratory status, race, ethnicity, income or geographic area.
16. World Bank, 2021.
17. Information on corporate and individual tax rates was derived from the PWC Worldwide Tax Summaries.
18. IMF, 2016.
19. PWC, 2022.
20. Information on value added and excise tax rates was derived from the PWC Worldwide Tax Summaries.
21. See the World Bank Data Bank on Tax Revenue (% of GDP) – High Income Countries.
22. ILO, 2019a.
23. Saudi Gazette, 2021, accessed on 4 May 2023.
24. See GCC Stat on Labour Statistics in the GCC Countries, first quarter 2022, accessed on 4 May 2023.
25. ILO, 2019a.
26. The United Arab Emirates, the United Arab Emirates’ Government portal.
27. In this analysis, middle-income and least developed countries include Algeria, the Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Somalia, the State of Palestine, the Sudan, Tunisia and Yemen.
28. ESCWA, 2022e.
29. Ibid.
30. Journal Officiel de la République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, 30 décembre 2021.
31. ESCWA, 2022e.
32. Ibid.
33. Data from ILOStat, Indicator 8.3.1, Proportion of Informal Employment in Total Employment by Sex and Sector.
34. In this analysis, countries experiencing conflict or fragility include Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, the State of Palestine, Somalia, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen.
35. Gill and Nagle, 2022.
36. ESCWA, 2021b.
37. Joint SDF Fund and others, 2023.
38. FAO, UNICEF and WFP, 2022.
39. ESCWA, 2019.
40. OECD, 2021a.
41. OECD, 2021b.
42. SEMC, 2021.
43. Al-Akhali, 2021.
44. European Parliament, Directorate-General for External Policies, 2017.
45. Bahadur, 2022.
46. ESCWA, 2023b.
47. ESCWA, IOM and UNHCR, 2022.
48. Gulf Research Center, Percentage of Nationals and Non-nationals in Gulf Populations (2020).
49. Gulf Research Center, Percentage of Nationals and Non-nationals in GCC Countries’ Employed Populations (2020).
50. Human Rights Watch, 2020.
51. ESCWA, IOM and UNHCR, 2022.
52. Migrant Forum in Asia, 2012.
53. See the Expat Protection Center.
54. In this analysis, middle-income countries include Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, the State of Palestine and Tunisia. Maghreb countries include Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. Mashreq countries include Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, the State of Palestine and the Syrian Arab Republic.
55. According to the Situation Report on International Migration 2021, the Mashreq region hosts 7.2 million migrants and refugees. UNHCR reports that 3.5 million Palestinian refugees are in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic, and 1.9 million Syrian refugees are in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon.
56. UNHCR, n.d.
57. ILO and UNHCR, 2018.
58. ILO, 2014.
59. ESCWA, IOM and UNHCR, 2022.
60. In this analysis, least developed countries and countries experiencing conflict or fragility include the Comoros, Djibouti, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Somalia, the State of Palestine, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, and Yemen.
61. ESCWA, IOM and UNHCR, 2022.
62. Ibid.
63. ESCWA, 2022d.
64. ESCWA, 2023a.
65. Algeria, 2022.
66. Algerie Eco, 2022.
67. Brumby and Keen, 2018.
68. ESCWA, 2020.
69. ESCWA, 2021a.
70. See more on the IOM Arab Regional Consultative Process on Migration and Refugee Affairs.
71. ESCWA and others, 2021.
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