Systemic governance challenges and the lack of right-based social contracts stymie the implementation of SDG 16 “Peace, justice and strong institutions” in the Arab region. Public spending deficits compound and are exacerbated by the low responsiveness, transparency, accountability and efficiency of national institutions. Such weaknesses curtail the ability of Governments to design and enforce robust policies for achieving sustainable development, directly impacting all SDGs.
The performance of audit institutions varies significantly within the region, while the role of parliaments in budgetary oversight is likewise quite diverse. Access to information by the public, press and researchers is typically constrained. The independence of the judiciary and the media is under question. Participation in decision-making remains limited and political representation is often far from inclusive. All these factors undercut human rights and hinder the reduction of inequality.
Seven countries are in conflict, impacting the potential for regional integration and cooperation. Conflicts give rise to forced migration and increase poverty, and lead to drastic reductions in living standards and reversals of socioeconomic progress. The collapse, fragmentation and weaknesses of State institutions in countries in conflict have a long-term negative impact on peace, security and development, undermining the potential for a vibrant civil society to facilitate reconciliation.1 The destruction of infrastructure and regression in development gains have ripple effects across generations, further impeding progress on the SDGs.
Restoring trust in institutions and the rule of law and strengthening their effectiveness in securing justice and sustainable development for all are critical for the region to reduce and prevent violence, involve citizens and civil society in decision-making, and build peaceful societies through inclusive, rights-based social contracts.
Sources: ESCWA, 2022d.
Conflict-related risk in the region has risen in the past decade. As of 2021, it is more vulnerable and less resilient to conflict than in 2010. The region also saw a marked deterioration in terms of economic risks, with countries more vulnerable to shocks than in the previous decade, as well as in climate risks amid worsening natural disasters. It improved only on social risks between 2010 and 2021, given expanding social safety nets and decreasing infant mortality rates. 
| Risk domain | Component | 2010 | 2015 | 2021 | 2021 compared to 2010 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Conflict risk |
Vulnerability
Resilience
|
0.29
0.48
|
0.41
0.44
|
0.32
0.43
|
10%
-11%
|
Deteriorated
Deteriorated
|
| Climate hazard risk |
Vulnerability
Resilience
|
0.11
0.30
|
0.16
0.35
|
0.18
0.47
|
59%
56%
|
Deteriorated
Improved
|
| Natural resource risk |
Vulnerability
Resilience
|
0.47
0.39
|
0.49
0.39
|
0.49
0.38
|
5%
-4%
|
Deteriorated
Deteriorated
|
| Economic risk |
Vulnerability
Resilience
|
0.39
0.65
|
0.40
0.59
|
0.43
0.55
|
9%
-15%
|
Deteriorated
Deteriorated
|
| Social risk |
Vulnerability
Resilience
|
0.37
0.50
|
0.34
0.53
|
0.33
0.51
|
-9%
4%
|
Improved
Improved
|
| Institutional risk |
Vulnerability
Resilience
|
0.66
0.43
|
0.69
0.41
|
0.70
0.40
|
7%
-8%
|
Deteriorated
Deteriorated
|
Action-oriented, technically-informed operationalization of the humanitarian-development-peace nexus in countries experiencing conflict or fragility is limited. The nexus represents a critical framework to address complex crises. Linking humanitarian, development and peace efforts can reduce service delivery gaps and duplications while better tackling the root causes of critical situations.8 Most work on the nexus has involved the multilateral system and international organizations. National institutions have made limited efforts to mainstream it. A complicating factor has been the tendency, over the last few years, to devote a much larger share of aid to crisis responses (humanitarian aid) as opposed to development assistance (development aid), limiting resources to tackle the roots of crises.
There are tentative signals of embedding long-term reconciliation in peacebuilding agendas in countries in conflict. For instance:
In Iraq, the Integrated Reconciliation Project
(2017–2021) supported a national agenda for long-term reconciliation by creating infrastructure to promote peace, focusing on the most vulnerable communities and minorities. The initiative created and strengthened community social cohesion mechanisms, providing socioeconomic support services, reinforcing civil society capacities, and bolstering national systems to effectively coordinate and plan social cohesion and reconciliation efforts.9
In Libya, the Presidential Council in February
2023 convened a national dialogue to achieve reconciliation.10 In addition, a socioeconomic vision was developed in 2021 under the Libya Socioeconomic Dialogue Project.11 It provided informed options for strategic policies to move from a logic of rent-seeking and exploitation to one of institutions based on the principles of justice and equity, dignity, and universal rights and fundamental freedoms. It suggested avenues for a shift from a rentier economy to a productive and diversified one for the sake of a peaceful and prosperous society.12 Despite the continuing division of the country between two administrations, the announcement
of measures to reunify the Central Bank of Libya offers scope for cautious optimism regarding the collective intent of Libyan actors to advance towards a unified nation.
As a result of the Israeli occupation, the State of Palestine faces economic hardships, insecurity, violence and death. All facets of life and development are under siege. Seeking to realize the vision of an independent sovereign State, with sovereignty over the entire territory defined by the 1967 borders, including East Jerusalem as the capital, the State
of Palestine has activated mechanisms for holding Israel to account before international structures and courts. This is in addition to its participation in the multilateral system and consolidation of bilateral relations.
In Somalia, despite fragmentation between the federal Government and regional States, as well as tensions on issues related to governance, resource allocation and jurisdiction, the National Consultative Council reached an agreement on a model for fiscal federalism and amendments to the national security architecture. The model specifies the creation of two independent agencies: a national revenue authority and a planning and allocation agency. Worsening violence in the Sudan has fragmented and weakened national institutions, with the potential for a full-fledged civil war and humanitarian crisis. As part of efforts by international and regional actors to prevent escalation, the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, supported by the United Nations, have adopted a conflict resolution road map. In addition, leaders of the armed movements that
are signatories to the Juba Peace Agreement are officially committed to neutrality in the conflict and are making efforts to restore peace. Civil society is playing a key role in the peace process, advocating for ending the violence and working for peace locally through the Declaration of Principles of Civil Actors for Ending the War and Restoring Democracy. Agreements on several ceasefires to enable the delivery of humanitarian assistance are paralysed, however.
In the Syrian Arab Republic, despite a continued deadlock in the political process and a significant economic crisis, recent years have seen a reduction in violence and armed conflict in most parts of the country. Reintegration into the League of Arab States happened 12 years after the country’s suspension following the outbreak of the conflict in 2011. This is expected to enable delivery of humanitarian aid to those in need, in accordance with mechanisms adopted in relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions. In Yemen, coordination between the Central
Bank offices in Aden and Sana’a is attempting to unify currency and monetary policies after years of different banknotes and exchange rates. Negotiations include resuming the payment of civil service salaries after a five-year period of irregular disbursements. These are steps towards unifying public institutions to revive the public sector and increase capacities to address basic needs in a population of 30 million, of which 21 million are in dire need of humanitarian assistance.
Justice and peace for the Palestinian people require ending the Israeli occupation and associated discriminatory practices and violations of human rights and international law. The blockade imposed on Gaza since 2007 and a series of violent offensives have resulted in “de-development” and a humanitarian crisis, condemning the entire population to be left behind, with women, children, the elderly and persons with disabilities in severely disadvantaged positions.
Living conditions in Gaza were already precarious before the war broke out in October 2023 in terms of poverty (61 per cent in 2020), unemployment (45 per cent in 2022) and food insecurity (63 per cent of households in 2022). The total siege of Gaza has resulted in tens of thousands of deaths and plunged 2.3 million people into deprivation. Essential services have been disrupted by attacks on civilian infrastructure, including the targeting of hospitals and medical centres. The war is forcing the population to use unsafe water and sanitation facilities. Heavy bombardment, massive destruction of houses, the displacement of more than 1.5 million people, and a lack of critical medical, food, water and energy supplies have multidimensional impacts, compounding losses related to safety, health, education and income. Heightened insecurity, reduced trade and increased production costs will have long-term negative effects on the economy. The financial stability of the State of Palestine and the banking sector will be at much greater risk. The war could also compel neighbouring countries to redirect resources from development to security expenses.
Government effectiveness varies widely in the region,13 influenced by history, economics and geopolitics. Gulf Cooperation Council countries generally perform well on government effectiveness, given financial abundance and political stability. Countries experiencing conflict or fragility have highly compromised government effectiveness due to war and institutional fragility. Middle-income countries that are not in conflict fall in-between, showing some deterioration in government effectiveness.
Ineffective institutions, with limited accountability, can create a breeding ground for social and political instability and conflict. Such institutions also hinder the capacity to deal with shocks or disasters, including natural ones. Several human and climate-related disasters have resulted in massive losses of lives that could have been avoided with the effective mitigation of risks. The collapse of the two dams in Derna, Libya, in September 2023, is one example, where conflict
and extreme weather collided, yielding disastrous outcomes. The dams collapsed due to poor maintenance and inadequate operation, which in turn stemmed
from fragmented, divided and weak institutions and supervision. Libya also lacks effective institutional systems for disaster prevention and management. Prior to this disaster, a decade of turmoil had left 300,000 people in need of humanitarian aid, an already high number that increased to more than 850,000 after Storm Daniel. In Lebanon, the Beirut port explosion on 4 August 2020 was another example of the failure of institutions. In this case, they did not take decisive action to remove dangerous material from a heavily populated urban area.
Unconstitutional transitions of power are undermining the rule of law and human rights and weakening governance systems. In the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, substantial financial resources
have facilitated investments in legal and institutional frameworks. These nations often have modern legal systems, better law enforcement capabilities and more stable governance structures, but limited political freedoms and human rights concerns persist. In contrast, countries in conflict face severe challenges in upholding the rule of law. Ongoing conflicts have led to the collapse of institutions and lawlessness, contributing to human rights abuses and war crimes. Judicial systems are either dysfunctional or under the control of conflicting parties. Middle-income countries that are not in conflict have made modest progress but face substantial challenges from corruption, a lack of judicial independence and limited political freedoms.
Curtailments of freedom of speech and assembly are routine, and the prosecution and jailing of writers, journalists and activists is common across the region. Yet all national constitutions – except in Qatar and Saudi Arabia – include guarantees of freedom of expression or opinion.14 Freedom of assembly, freedom of association and freedom of the press are also enshrined in most constitutions, except Djibouti, Saudi Arabia and Yemen for freedom of assembly; Saudi Arabia for freedom of association; and Djibouti, Mauritania, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen for freedom of the press.15 Overall, enforcement remains inconsistent.
In Kuwait, the Government amended its freedom of speech laws to prohibit pretrial detention for defendants in freedom of expression cases. A new law on the public’s right to access information came into effect in 2021, allowing Kuwaiti nationals to request information, decisions and documents from government entities.16 The law of Morocco 76–15 (2018) expanded the mission of the National Human Rights Council, an independent institution promoting civic space by monitoring government adherence to human rights standards, investigating complaints and making recommendations for policy improvements.17 The 2019 law governing NGOs in Egypt removed
jail penalties from a former law controlling NGOs’ operations and eliminated formal oversight roles
for security and intelligence authorities. Executive regulations clarifying the law in 2021 stated that NGOs would have exclusive access to and control
of their funds as well as procedural protections,
such as impartial administrative and judicial appeal mechanisms.18 However, international NGOs stated that the new regulations maintained many restrictions on NGOs’ work in Egypt.
In Libya, the Presidential Council announced on
6 August 2023 that a High Financial Management Committee would supervise public finances and promote principles of fairness, accountability and transparency in public spending. This is a milestone as a Libyan-owned mechanism for transparent management of public funds.
All Arab countries are parties to the United Nations Convention against Corruption, except the Syrian Arab Republic, which has signed but not ratified it. The convention is the only legally binding, universal anti-corruption instrument, superseding national laws when ratified. Anti-corruption legislation in the region has advanced in recent years, primarily fuelled by the adoption of pivotal laws and expanded assessments based on a broader set of indicators. This progress reflects a more in-depth legislative approach to combating corruption and enhancing integrity across the public sector. It signifies an intensified commitment to bolstering transparency and accountability as well as regulatory mechanisms.
The region still faces considerable challenges, however, in ensuring the effective implementation of anti-corruption laws. All countries have legislation criminalizing bribery in the public sector, for example, but enforcement lags. A significant stumbling block arises from major exemptions and immunities in some countries, which effectively undermine the potency of anti-corruption legislation. These exemptions frequently benefit individuals or entities with political or commercial advantages, thereby perpetuating the cycle of corruption.
Gulf Cooperation Council countries score highest
in terms of anti-corruption legislation. They have established public procurement standards and promote open government and transparency.
Kuwait and Qatar have incorporated international agreements and commitments against corruption
into legislative frameworks. Beyond the adoption of
its Integrity and Anti-Corruption Strategy 2019–2024, Kuwait passed a law that establishes the Public Anti-Corruption Authority, and an anti-corruption and wealth disclosure decree criminalizes corruption. Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia also match some international standards for anti-corruption measures.
Libya and the Syrian Arab Republic rank lowest on anti-corruption efforts in the Maghreb and Mashreq subregions, respectively. There are gaps in the enforcement of anti-corruption legislation in Lebanon, Mauritania, Somalia, the State of Palestine and the United Arab Emirates.
Source: World Bank, World Governance Indicators.| Country | Title of the law | Year of adoption |
|---|---|---|
| Morocco | Anti-Corruption Law No. 46.19 | 2021 |
| Qatar |
Penal Code 2004, Arts. 140–158
Code of Conduct (Law No. 18/2020)
|
2020
2020
|
| Sudan | Anti-Corruption National Commission Law | 2021 |
| Lebanon |
Law on Anti-Corruption in the Public Sector, Establishment of the National Anti-Corruption Authority (Law No. 175/2020)
Law on Financial Disclosure, Conflicts of Interest and Illicit Enrichment
New Public Procurement Law (No. 244/2021)
|
2020
2020
2021
|
| Saudi Arabia |
Public Procurement Law M/128
Digital Government Authority Law (No. 418/2021)
|
2020
2023
|
Women’s participation in political life and peace and security processes is a prevalent issue in national action plans on women, peace and security. These focus on three priorities: Increasing women’s participation in political leadership and decision-making positions, especially senior civil service and elected positions. The national action plans of the State of Palestine, Tunisia and Yemen refer to judicial positions as well. Increasing the participation of women in public life, including as voters, entrants to the civil service, the security forces and other spheres. Increasing the participation of women in conflict prevention and mitigation, peace mediation, and humanitarian and post-conflict support. Notable differences exist among approaches to this issue. For example, while Iraq cites measures to support women’s roles as civilian monitors and military observers, Tunisia focuses on their parts in preventing and countering violent extremism, among other priorities.20 The region lacks adequate structures for the civic and political engagement of young people. This intensifies their sense of exclusion, dissatisfaction and distrust of political leaders and systems. Although laws governing political parties often do not support youth political engagement and leadership, countries have formulated youth policies or strategies21 that address issues of concern to young women and men. Most emphasize youth participation in decision-making. Some countries have also addressed youth participation in peace and resilience-building. Several countries are considering volunteerism and youth engagement in legislation related to young people, recognizing the role they can play in civic spaces, violence prevention and peacebuilding.
Developed by Iraq in 2021, the Youth Vision for 2030 focuses on peace, security and dialogue as well as citizenship and participation, among other issues. One proposed intervention to promote citizenship and participation involves establishing consultation meetings between young people and local authorities at the governorate level.22 Iraq in 2020 launched the National Coalition on Youth Peace and Security to engage in dialogues with decision-makers, supporting the participation of young peace activists in peacebuilding and fostering exchanges of experiences and knowledge. The coalition also advocates for the implementation of the Youth, Peace and Security Agenda.23Adopted in 2019, the Jordanian National Youth Strategy 2019–2025 calls for strengthening the resilience of young people to deal with emerging challenges and promote sustainable development.24 Jordan also formed a Youth, Peace and Security 2250 National Coalition, in reference to a United Nations Security Council resolution on the issue; it operates under the Ministry of Youth.25 Lebanon launched the National Youth Policy Action Plan in 2022. It is aligned with the 2012 National Youth Policy’s five priority areas, including social integration and political participation, and aims to support young people in volunteering and participating in decision-making. The establishment of a National Youth Council enables consultations with the Government. It serves as a platform to communicate concerns and viewpoints, and was instrumental in lowering the voting age to 18 for parliamentary and municipal elections.26Mauritania, in 2022, drafted legislation to institutionalize a national programme on voluntary engagement in sustainable development. The legislation creates a legal environment supporting young volunteers working on development projects throughout the country. It will operationalize an inclusive national mechanism for managing young people mobilized for volunteering. The goal is to deploy more than 10,000 young people, half of whom are women, as part of community development activities, especially in education, health, legal assistance, social cohesion, environmental preservation, civil protection and sustainable development. In Palestine, volunteering is regulated through legislation on civil society organizations. In the Jenin Creative Cultural Centre, volunteers have used art and cultural projects to foster peace and justice in the West Bank. The National Youth Policy of the Federal Government of Somalia27 incorporates 10 priority pillars for supporting young people, among which are peace and security, and participation and citizenship. The policy encourages young men and women to engage in decision-making processes. It is designed to increase their awareness of active and responsible citizenship and to create opportunities for participation, including through forming youth advisory councils and promoting volunteering.28 In Tunisia, an open data hackathon has been organized annually since 2020. In May 2023, 33 teams comprising students, start-up founders and young professionals used open government data
to create solutions that could improve government service delivery.
In the United Arab Emirates, a federal law regulates volunteer work. In addition, subnational laws in individual emirates regulate voluntarism, such as in Dubai. In line with its federal counterpart, it sets out minimum protection standards for volunteers and recognizes voluntarism’s contribution overall.29
Public participation is weak in the region, with most
countries lacking a specific open government strategy
or action plan.
Some have initiated national plans that
include some dimensions of open government, especially
open data. Only eight countries30 have laws or guarantees
of public access to information. Eleven countries31 have
launched their own open data platforms, and an additional
six32 make open data available through the portal of the
African Development Bank.
Digital government (or e-government) has progressed
in the region, transforming the operations and services
of public institutions.
Countries have developed digital
policies to modernize public entities33 and advance
digital transformation.34 The use of digital technologies
by governments, in partnership with the private sector,
accelerated during the COVID-19 pandemic to maintain
essential public services in health, education and social
protection (see the chapter on SDG 9). Nevertheless,
wide regional differences are evident in e-government
effectiveness in delivering public services.35 The Gulf
Cooperation Council countries outperform other States. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates perform the
best in e-government and open data and have won United
Nations public service awards for digital solutions.36 
Source: UN DESA, United Nations E-Government Knowledgebase.
Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia are members of the
Open Government Partnership, with national
action plans for citizen participation and public
engagement in decision-making. These countries
have enshrined access to information in their
constitutions.
Egypt launched Sharek 2030, an application
that informs the public about governmental
initiatives, laws and policies, and collects citizens’
views, proposals and suggestions to improve
public services.
In 2020, Jordan adopted three protocols on
classifying, enforcing and managing information,
providing clearer procedures and standards to
strengthen the law on access to information and
its implementation by public institutions.39
Kuwait adopted Law No (12) on the right to access
to information (2020–2021).
In Morocco, the Commission on the Right to
Information launched its digital platform in 2020,
where requests for information can be submitted
and tracked.40
The State of Palestine launched its open data
initiative in 2018 to promote innovation,
increase transparency, strengthen government
performance, and build trust between the
Government and citizens. Data sets have been
published, and laws on access to information and
personal data protection are undergoing review.
Training courses are continuously organized for
technical teams to build skills, and an open data
policy was approved.41
Saudi Arabia adopted a digital transformation
strategy, the Smart Government Strategy
2020–2024. Its purpose is to create a responsive
and effective citizen-centric Government through
the use and deployment of technologies. In 2023,
the Digital Government Authority released a report
on the readiness of government institutions to
adopt emerging technologies so that agencies
can identify gaps as well as training and
strategic needs.
The United Arab Emirates is among the 15
leading countries worldwide on e-government
services. The Government launched the Unified
Digital Channel in 2023, a citizen-centric digital
Government portal that provides access to more
than 3,000 services.
Discriminatory laws and practices against minorities persist in many Arab countries, posing significant challenges to human rights, social cohesion and inclusive governance. Discrimination manifests in unequal access to education (for example, limited access to quality education for marginalized groups such as refugees and rural residents as well as gender-based discrimination that restricts girls’ education in some areas; see the chapter on SDG 4), employment (gender-, nationality- and religion-based discrimination; see the chapter on SDG 8) and political representation (the exclusion of groups of people or ethnic or religious minorities from the political process, and weak representation of women in institutions). Individuals and groups subject to discrimination based on identity or status, including the poor, people with disabilities, ethnic and religious minorities, refugees and migrant workers, among others, are often subject to multiple, intersecting constraints on political, economic and social participation.
A few national accountability mechanisms or regulatory frameworks prosecute offenders for violence against women committed in conflict settings and provide reparations for victims.
But there has been little progress in implementing these frameworks. While some countries have legal frameworks to indict perpetrators of acts of sexual violence against women, they apply a narrow definition that does not account for all forms of violence inflicted in conflict, including forced marriage and sexual slavery and exploitation
(see the chapter on SDG 5). Generally, issues
related to advancing gender equality and eliminating discrimination against women and girls become less of a priority in conflict-affected countries. Even in
post-conflict settings, gender concerns are seldom prominently included in reconstruction agendas.
In Iraq, the Yazidi Female Survivors Law of 2021 recognizes the crimes against Yazidi, Turkmen, Christian and Shabak communities as crimes against humanity, and provides for reparations to survivors and rehabilitation. The law makes Iraq one of the first countries in the region to recognize female survivors of conflict-related sexual violence. The law does not cover women and girls who are victims of sexual violence through forced marriage to members of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and children born of wartime rape.45The Ministerial Decree 119 of 2014 of Libya recognized survivors of sexual violence during its uprising as war victims and gave them a right to reparation. In Somalia, the Sexual Offences Bill, endorsed by the Council of Ministers in 2018, deals with crimes of sexual exploitation, slavery, trafficking, abduction and kidnapping as well as forced marriage. It is still pending review and approval by the Parliament,46 and continues to trigger negative reactions from religious leaders and clan elders.47 The Sudan amended the 1991 Criminal Act in 2009 to include conflict-related sexual violence as a war crime.
Arab States are making efforts to end human trafficking, abuse and exploitation,
building on the
United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children
(the Palermo Protocol). Policy responses to trafficking
in persons, including forced labour, have encompassed drafting and revising laws and action plans, establishing specialized committees and organizing awareness campaigns. Fewer efforts have been pursued to address migrant smuggling. Some countries guarantee freedom of movement for migrants (Bahrain), do not penalize smuggled migrants (Egypt) or prohibit arbitrary arrest (Lebanon). Kuwait has created alternatives to detention facilities. Governments of countries48 that give national employers sponsorship permits to bring in foreign workers – binding the latter to their employers, with risks of exploitation,
and posing issues related to labour rights and working conditions, especially for domestic workers – have moved to regularize the stays of migrants or facilitate their departure without penalties, including through reforms of the kafala system (see the chapter on SDG 10).
In Egypt, the National Coordinating Committee for Combating and Preventing Illegal Migration and Human Trafficking launched a campaign, “Together Against Human Trafficking”, urging citizens to report cases through hotlines.
Iraq issued its national anti-trafficking action plan in March 2019.In Jordan, in addition to a law on countering human trafficking, the National Strategy for Human Trafficking 2019–2022 seeks to address human trafficking through complementary efforts among relevant entities.Kuwait adopted a national referral system to prevent human trafficking. In Lebanon, civil society organizations support the protection of victims, and several laws address trafficking in persons, including migrant domestic workers.In Morocco, Law No. 14–27 includes provisions for protecting victims of exploitation (forced labour and servitude), and Law No. 12–19 clarifies labour and employment conditions for domestic workers. Morocco also established a national commission to combat trafficking in persons (2019). The National Committee to Combat Human Trafficking of Qatar monitors cases and refers them to competent authorities. A unit to track data has been established within the Public Prosecution Office, and the Qatar Red Crescent Department opened the Humanitarian Care Home for victims. The Sudan amended its Combating of Human Trafficking Act with stringent penalties for violators. It created the National Committee to Combat Human Trafficking and launched the National Action Plan for Combating Human Trafficking 2021–2023. In addition, the Better Migration Management programme, funded by the European Union and Germany, has supported the Government in countering human trafficking and improving the protection of victims and vulnerable migrants. Tunisia established a national mechanism to guide and support victims of trafficking, providing them with free medical care.
Some countries have legislative reforms and strategic action-oriented instruments to prevent sexual, physical and psychological violence against children.
Based on an exemplary institutional and legislative framework in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, the
federal Government committed to a Child Protection Directorate, with a draft Child Protection Law under review by Parliament.
Jordan, which recently enacted a Child Rights Law, and the United Arab Emirates, where a new draft motherhood and childhood strategy is being developed, are among the pathfinding countries under the Global Partnership to End Violence Against Children.49 They are expected to develop national action plans to address violence against children.
In Morocco, the integrated public policy for child protection 2015–2025 aims to strengthen the legal framework, promote protective standards and practices, and set up information and monitoring systems. In addition, the National Action Plan to End Child Marriage promotes social protection and social services for the empowerment and education of girls, strengthens judicial practices and supports new amendments to the family code. The State of Palestine launched a national intersectoral violence against children strategy in the context of COVID-19 (2021–2023).50 Qatar developed a draft Child Protection Law, including provisions for protection from exploitation. It prohibits all forms of corporal punishment against children, and strengthens capacities to monitor cases of violence. Institutional support for victims of violence is provided in social rehabilitation centres.In Saudi Arabia, a national child online safety framework, a national policy on anti-bullying, and a national schools well-being framework are under development. The National Strategic Plan for the Prevention of and Action on Family Violence are intended to address the needs of victims of violence and battered people through family visitations and the fostering of children subjected to violence. In the Sudan , the endorsement of the Child Act 2021 was delayed due to the political situation. In the Syrian Arab Republic, a law on protection from domestic violence is being drafted and a five-year national strategic plan for child protection is under development.
The region has notable measures to assist children from conflict-affected areas who are at risk of being left out of school
(see also the chapter on SDG 4):
In Jordan and Lebanon, education measures for Syrian refugee children are coordinated among national institutions, United Nations organizations and donors as part of the response to the Syrian crisis. Both countries have developed educational strategies to include refugee children in the public educational system, for instance, through the “second shift” programme (afternoon classes after morning sessions for nationals).
The Government of Jordan, through the 2018–2022 education strategic plan, made schools and learning facilities available to children regardless
of their status or nationality. The plan laid out concrete actions and investments, such as the establishment of 60 new schools per year to accommodate both Jordanians and refugees. Jordan also encourages Syrian children to return to schooling with campaigns to counter dropping out, bullying and violence among students. Some measures facilitate the registration of Syrian students in higher education, and extend work permits to support their entry into the labour market.
Migrants and migrant children in vulnerable situations, refugees and forcibly displaced persons often struggle to obtain education, employment and justice.
They are at risk of falling into the hands of criminal networks and being subjected to violence
and exploitation. The primary form of trafficking within the region is forced labour, including domestic
servitude and debt bondage, followed by forced and early marriage and sexual exploitation. Regarding child labour, notably in conflict-affected countries where law enforcement is lax and dire economic conditions leave children with no other options, many young workers come from groups already facing discrimination, including refugees and migrants.
Syrian refugees have been allowed to work in several sectors of the economy in Jordan since 2016. In 2021, a record 62,000 work permits were issued to Syrians, including 31,000 flexible ones; refugees holding these can move between similar jobs in the same sector as well as among employers and governorates. Previously, Syrian refugees were mostly allowed to work only in agriculture, construction and manufacturing. In 2020, some exemptions were given to work in other sectors, including as health-care professionals to help fight COVID-19. Since 2021, Syrian refugees have been able to obtain work permits in all sectors open to non-Jordanians.
Qatar passed the Council of Ministers decision No. 13 of 2019 defining the rights, advantages and benefits of political refugees, with provisions on freedom of movement, the right to work, housing, health care and education.
1. Abu-Ismail, Chaitani and Nehme, 2021.
2. See the Global Peace Index, 2022.
3. ESCWA, 2023d. See also UNDP, 2022.
4. Data on humanitarian assistance from the Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) for Iraq, Libya, the State of Palestine, Somalia, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen.
5. See the UNHCR Refugee Data Finder, accessed on 1 February 2024.
6. A composite index measuring the peacefulness of countries made up of 23 quantitative and qualitative indicators.
7. They are performing better than the 15 Arab countries on the second half of the index, including six and nine in the third and last quantiles, respectively: Morocco at 84, Algeria at 96, Bahrain at 108, Djibouti at 112, Mauritania at 114, Saudi Arabia at 119, Egypt at 121, the State of Palestine at 134, Lebanon at 135, Libya at 137, Iraq at 154, the Sudan at 155, Somalia at 156, the Syrian Arab Republic at 161 and Yemen at 162. See 2023 Global Peace Index.
8. For instance, the United Nations Secretary-General’s Peacebuilding Fund links recovery, stabilization, local governance and peacebuilding, investing in programmes that support local authorities in rebuilding trust around service delivery, local conflict resolution and employment. See more on the Peacebuilding Fund.
9. See the Integrated Reconciliation Project.
10. Bchir, 2023.
11. The project was carried out in partnership with ESCWA and Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit with the support of a Libyan consulting group.
12. ESCWA, 2021b.
13. Government effectiveness is a critical factor that determines the quality of governance, the functionality of institutions and the overall well-being of citizens.
14. Algeria (2020), Bahrain (2017 revision), the Comoros (2018), Djibouti (2010 revision), Egypt (2019 revision), Iraq (2005), Jordan (2016), Kuwait (1992), Lebanon (2004 revision), Libya (2012 revision), Mauritania (2012 revision), Morocco (2011), Oman (2011 revision), State of Palestine (2005 revision), Somalia (2012), the Sudan (2019), Syrian Arab Republic (2012), Tunisia (2014), United Arab Emirates (2009 revision) and Yemen (2015 revision). Source: Constitute.
15. See Constitute.
16. United States Department of State, 2022b.
17. See the CNDH Mandate for the Protection of Human Rights.
18. United States Department of State, 2022a.
19. See more on Vision 2030.
20. ESCWA, 2023c.
21. Djibouti, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, the State of Palestine, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen. See AUB and UNFPA, 2021. Some policies or strategies have expired and have not been replaced.
22. See Iraq’s Youth Vision for 2030.
23. Arab Reform Initiative, 2022.
24. See Jordan’s National Youth Strategy 2019–2025.
25. UNFPA, 2020.
26. See Lebanon’s National Youth Policy Action Plan.
27. Somali Youth Hub, 2023.
28. See the the National Youth Policy of the Federal Government of Somalia.
29. See Federal Law No. 13 and Law No. (5) of 2018.
30. Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, Tunisia and Yemen. UNESCO, 2021. See also the Global Right to Information Rating by Country.
31. Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the State of Palestine, Tunisia and the United Arab Emirates.
32. Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Mauritania, Somalia and the Sudan.
33. Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, the State of Palestine, Qatar and the Syrian Arab Republic.
34. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
35. DESA, 2022.
36. Saudi Arabia was one of the 2022 winners for the COVID-19 Tawakkalna application, while the United Arab Emirates was one of the 2015 winners based on the National Validation Gateway initiative. See more on the Public Service Innovation Hub.
37. See Law No. 2016–22.
38. Human Rights Watch, 2019.
39. OECD and ESCWA, 2022.
40. See the Chafafiya platform.
41. See more on the Open Government Data Initiative.
42. Djibouti, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, the State of Palestine, Somalia, the Sudan, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen.
43. The women, peace and security agenda seeks to support the participation of women in advancing peace and security, and ensure their protection from sexual and gender-based violence in situations of conflict. It comprises four main pillars: participation, protection, prevention, and relief and recovery.
44. ESCWA, 2023c.
45. United Nations, 2022.
46. ESCWA and others, 2019.
47. United Nations, 2023.
48. All Gulf Cooperation Council countries, Jordan and Lebanon.
49. Since its launch in July 2016, the Global Partnership to End Violence Against Children has promoted the concept of pathfinding, which aims to raise awareness, stimulate leadership commitment, galvanize action and establish a standard of national violence prevention throughout the world.
50. See more on the State of Palestine’s strategy.
51. ESCWA, 2023a, 2022c, 2017b.
52. ESCWA, 2018b, 2017a.
53. ESCWA, 2018a.
54. ESCWA, 2023a, 2022c.
55. ESCWA, 2018a.
56. Costing estimates include information for Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Jordan, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
58. 15.5 per cent in Libya, 7.3 per cent in Oman, 6.7 per cent in Kuwait, 6.6 per cent in Saudi Arabia, and 5.6 per cent each in Algeria and the United Arab Emirates.
59. More than 20 per cent in Oman, Qatar and Saudi Arabia.
60. See the GlobalEconomy.com, Military spending, percent of GDP – Country rankings.
61. See more on the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions.
62. See more on the Arab Network for National Human Rights Institutions.
Abu-Ismail, K., Y. Chaitani and M. Nehme (2021). Domestic Conflict: A Proposed Index and Its Implications for Arab States.
Arab Reform Initiative (2022). Youth, peace, and security in Iraq: operationalizing youth peacebuilding priorities in practice.
American University of Beirut (AUB) and United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) (2021). Mapping of Youth Policies in the Arab Region.
Bchir, M. (2023). Beyond Elections: Libya Needs Unified Institutions and Reconciliation. United States Institute of Peace.
Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) (2017a). The Arab Financing Development Scorecard. Beirut.
__________ (2017b). Rethinking Fiscal Policy for the Arab Region. Beirut.
__________ (2018a). Illicit Financial Flows in the Arab Region. Beirut.
__________ (2018b). The State of Financing Development in the Arab Region. Beirut.
__________ (2021a). Arab Business Legislative Frameworks. Beirut.
__________ (2021b). Vision for Libya: Towards Prosperity, Justice and Strong State Institutions. Beirut.
__________ (2022a). Fourth Arab Governance Report: Equality, Inclusion and Empowerment for More Effective Conflict Prevention. Beirut.
__________ (2022b). GEMS Maturity Index.
__________ (2022c). Survey of Economic and Social Developments in the Arab Region 2021–2022. Beirut.
__________ (2022d). World Development Challenges Report: Development from a Broader Lens. Beirut.
__________ (2023a). Arab Policy Choices and Financing Opportunities in a New World Tax Order. Beirut.
__________ (2023b). Gaza War: expected socioeconomic impacts on the State of Palestine preliminary estimations until 5 November 2023. Policy Brief. Beirut.
__________ (2023c). Implementing the Women, Peace and Security Agenda in the Arab Region. Beirut.
__________ (2023d). Progress of the Sustainable Development Goals in the Arab Region. Beirut.
__________ (2023e). War on Gaza: weaponizing access to water, energy and food. Policy Brief. Beirut.
__________ (2023f). War on Gaza: where everyone is left behind. Policy Brief. Beirut.
__________ (2023g). War on Gaza 2023: an unprecedented and devastating impact. Policy Brief. Beirut.
Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), and others (2019). Gender Justice and Equality Before the Law: Analysis of Progress and Challenges in the Arab States Region.
Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organization for Migration
International Organization for Migration (IOM) (2021). Situation Report on International Migration 2021: Building Forward Better for Migrants and Refugees in the Arab Region.
Human Rights Watch (2019). Tunisia: Citizens Testing Right-to-Information Law.
International Labour Organization (ILO) and United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) (2020). COVID-19 and Child Labour. A Time of Crisis, A Time to Act.
International Organization for Migration (IOM) (2021). Assessing the Socio-Economic Impact of COVID-19 on Migrants and Displaced Populations in the Middle East and North Africa.
International Telecommunication Union (ITU) (2022). Digital Development Dashboard.
Moubayed Bissat, L., and C. Rihan (2019). Implementing Agenda 2030 in the Arab world: contextualization, action areas and policy planning. Public Sector Economics.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) (2021). The Economic and Social Impact of Open Government: Policy Recommendations for the Arab Countries.
Somali Youth Hub (2023). Press Statement: The Somali Cabinet approved the National Youth Policy.
Transparency International (2023). 2022 Corruption Perceptions Index reveals how corruption fuels ongoing conflict in the Middle East and North Africa. 31 January.
United Nations (2022). Conflict-Related Sexual Violence: Report of the Secretary-General. S/2022/272.
__________ (2023). Conflict-Related Sexual Violence: Report of the Secretary-General. S/2023/413.
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) (2022). E-Government Survey 2022: The Future of Digital Government.
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2022). Demanding Greater Solidarity: New Threats to Human Security in the Anthropocene. New York.
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) (2021). To Recovery and Beyond: 2021 UNESCO Report on Public Access to Information (SDG 16.10.2).
United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) (2020). Jordan Youth Peace and Security 2250 National Coalition – A Year in Review.
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Norwegian Refugee Council (2021). Legal Identity and Housing, Land and Property Rights of Syrian Refugees from a Durable Solutions Perspective Challenges and Opportunities.
United States Department of State (2022a). 2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Egypt.
__________ (2022b). 2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Kuwait.
